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Because of its potential to improve the envi-
ronment and enhance national security, reduc-
ing automobile-related gasoline consumption
has become a major U.S. public policy issue.
Recently, many analysts have called for new or
more stringent policies to discourage gasoline
consumption. Proposals include a tightening of
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) stan-
dards and subsidies to retirements of older (gas-
guzzling) vehicles, as well as increments to the
federal gasoline tax. This paper examines the gas-
tax option, employing an econometrically based
multi-market simulation model to explore the pol-
icy’s efficiency and distributional implications.
This study differs from earlier work in several
ways. Some prior studies have investigated gas-
oline consumption either by employing a de-
mand function for gasoline or by deriving this
demand from households’ vehicle-miles trav-
eled (VMT).1 These studies treat the composi-
tion of the automobile fleet as fixed. However, a
gasoline tax can be expected to influence the
fleet composition (e.g., the market share of more
fuel-efficient cars) as well as the amount of driving.
This study allows for both impacts. As in Steven
Berry et al. (1995), Pinelopi Goldberg (1995), and
Amil Petrin (2002), we account for the imperfectly
competitive nature of the new-car market. However,
in contrast with these studies, we consider interac-
tions between the markets for new, used, and
scrapped cars.2 The impacts of a gasoline tax can
importantly depend on such interactions. Higher
gasoline taxes could stimulate higher rates of
scrappage of older, fuel-inefficient cars and could
also promote shifts in demand from used cars to
especially fuel-efficient new cars. Studies that ig-
nore these adjustments could understate a gas
tax’s impacts on fuel consumption.
Another set of differences from earlier work
is in the econometric approach. By allowing the
structural parameters entering preferences to
vary randomly across households, we can ac-
count for rich patterns of unobserved preference
heterogeneity. Also, in contrast with nearly all
prior work, we adopt an estimation approach that
simultaneously estimates in a utility-consistent
manner each household’s automobile choice
and its choice of VMT.3 This is important for
evaluating welfare impacts.4
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1 Richard Schmalensee and Thomas M. Stoker (1999)
and Sarah E. West and Robertson C. Williams III (2004) use
household-level data on gasoline consumption to estimate
the income and price elasticity of demand for gasoline. In
contrast, James Berkovec (1985), Fred Mannering and Clif-
ford Winston (1985), Kenneth E. Train (1986), and West
(2004) sequentially estimate automobile ownership and
VMT decisions using discrete-choice and linear-regression
techniques. These studies derive the elasticity of demand for
gasoline from the VMT elasticity and the fuel economy of
the different vehicles. James Poterba (1991) generates elas-
ticities of demand for gasoline use by transforming Train’s
(1986) estimates of elasticities for VMT.
2 Berkovec (1985) develops a model with interactions
among these markets. His model assumes pure competition
among auto producers, however.
3 The one exception is a recent working paper by Ye
Feng et al. (2004).
4 Prior studies have tended to focus on policies’ impacts on
prices or quantities, rather than the welfare consequences.
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An appendix to this paper, available on the
AER web site, details the simulation model’s
structure, data, estimation approach, and solu-
tion method.
We examine policy impacts both in the ag-
gregate and across households distinguished by
income, car-ownership, and other characteris-
tics. Simulation results show that whether a
gas-tax increase is regressive in its impact de-
pends on the manner in which the tax revenues
are recycled (returned) to the economy. The
results also reveal significant heterogeneity in
welfare impacts within household income
groups, thus highlighting the importance of ac-
counting for household heterogeneity in tastes
and car-ownership in evaluating distributional
impacts.
I. Structure of the Simulation Model
A. Household Demands
Households obtain utility from car ownership
and use, as well as from consumption of other
commodities. Utility from driving depends on
characteristics of the automobile and vehicle-
miles traveled. Each household has exogenous
income; most households also are endowed
with cars. If a household has a car endowment,
it chooses whether to hold or relinquish (sell or
scrap) that car; if it relinquishes the car it also
decides whether to purchase a different car (new
or used). Households without car endowments
simply choose whether to purchase a car.
U.S. auto markets include thousands of types
of new and used cars and trucks, and many
households own several vehicles. Households
enjoy a huge number of possible household car
choices, far more than would be tractable
econometrically or in a simulation model. To
achieve manageable dimensionality, we group
cars and trucks into 284 categories based on the
vehicle’s age, class, and manufacturer. In addi-
tion, to deal with multiple-car households, we
adopt a variation of the repeated discrete–
continuous modeling approach of Igal Hendel
(1999) and Jean-Pierre Dube´ (2004).5 Here we
assume that household automobile choices arise
from decisions made on T separable choice oc-
casions, where T depends on the number of
adults in the household. On each occasion, the
household makes a discrete choice of whether to
choose one of the 284 composite cars. If the jth
automobile is chosen, the household then makes
a continuous choice of VMT for the automobile.
A virtue of this approach is that it significantly
limits the dimensionality of the choice problem.
The disadvantage is that it implicitly assumes
that the household’s automobile decisions with
respect to different cars in its fleet are separable
from each other.6
More specifically, we assume that household
preferences on the tth choice occasion (t 
1, ... , T ) for the jth automobile ( j  1, ... , J )
can be represented by the conditional indirect
utility function Utj  Vj(y/T  rj, uj, qj, z, ) 
ij , where y is household income, rj, uj, and qj
are automobile j’s one-year rental price, per-
mile utilization price (i.e., operating cost), and
non-price characteristics, respectively. The vec-
tor z contains household’s characteristics,  is a
parameter vector that varies randomly across
households, and ij represents additional unob-
served heterogeneity that varies across house-
holds, automobiles, and choice occasions.
Similarly, if the household chooses not to rent
an automobile (i.e., chooses car 0), its prefer-
ences can be represented by Ut0  V0(y/T, z,
)  t0. The rational household chooses the
alternative that maximizes its utility. Assuming
that each tj is an independent draw from the
type-I extreme-value distribution with common
scale parameter , the probability that the
household chooses the jth automobile condi-
tional on  takes the standard conditional logit
form. Because we employ a theoretically con-
sistent preference specification, we can use
Roy’s identity to derive the conditional VMT
demand for the chosen automobile.
5 Most previous studies have avoided the difficulties
arising with multiple-car households by considering single
car purchases in the new-car market (e.g., Berry et al., 1995;
Goldberg, 1995) or by focusing on the roughly 85 percent of
households with two or fewer cars (West, 2004).
6 Work in progress adopts an alternative approach in
which households choose alternative bundles of cars. Feng
et al. (2004) have tried this approach, which has the attrac-
tion of permitting greater interdependencies among a house-
hold’s automobile choices. A drawback is that, in order to
keep tractable the dimensionality of the consumer’s choice
set, it requires a great deal more automobile aggregation as
well as restrictions on the number of cars households can
own.
283VOL. 95 NO. 2 CARS, GAS, AND POLLUTION POLICIES
B. Supply of New and Used Cars
The model distinguishes five age catego-
ries, ten car classes, and seven manufacturer
(make) categories.7 This yields 350 possible
age-class-manufacturer combinations, but since
some combinations are not realized the model
actually includes 284 cars.
Each of the seven producers acts in accor-
dance with Bertrand competition, setting the
prices for its fleet of automobiles to maximize
profits, given the prices set by its competitors.
New cars differ by class and manufacturer. Let
k index a given producer. Let  represent the
set of all new cars and let k   represent the
nk new cars manufactured by producer k. The
profit-maximization problem for producer k is
max
pj

jk
pj  mj qjp
subject to

jT
qj p ej  eT 0

jC
qj p ej  eC 0
where pj, mj, and qj are the price, marginal cost,
and quantity demanded of car j (which is made
by firm k). Marginal cost (m) is exogenous and
assumed to be constant; p denotes the vector of
all new car prices. The two constraints above
acknowledge the presence of CAFE standards.8
Above, eT and eC refer to the fuel economy
(miles per gallon) requirements for light trucks
and passenger cars, respectively, and ej refers to
the fuel economy of car j. Thus, the two con-
straints express the requirement that the given
manufacturer achieve fleet-wide average fuel
economy above eT and eC, respectively, for the
light trucks and cars it produces. To obtain the
equilibrium, all car prices (and associated mark-
ups) must be solved for simultaneously.
The stock of used cars is equal to an exog-
enously specified maximal amount, less the
number of scrapped cars. The amount of scrap-
page is endogenous. For each car type, there is
a probability distribution for maintenance costs.
If a household owns a car requiring exception-
ally high maintenance, it will prefer to scrap the
car rather than pay the costs of keeping the car
in operation.
Each car type, or age-class-manufacturer
combination, has its own market price. The
model determines the set of prices for all car
types that is consistent with each new-car pro-
ducer’s profit-maximization (first-order) condi-
tions and that clears the used-car market. Since
the demand for every car depends on the prices
of all other cars (new and used), all car prices
need to be solved for simultaneously.
II. Data and Econometric Estimation
We estimated the parameters entering house-
hold preferences for automobile demand with
the 2001 National Household Travel Survey
(NHTS), the most recent and comprehensive
survey of U.S. automobile demand. The NHTS
contains a cross-section of households’ com-
plete automobile holdings and VMT demands
as well as economic, demographic, and geo-
graphic data. From several other sources (see
Appendix on the AER web site) we obtained
information on car characteristics (e.g., weight,
horsepower, wheelbase, and fuel-economy) and
operating costs.
In designing an estimation approach, two is-
sues were especially important. First, for con-
sistent welfare assessments we wanted to
estimate simultaneously and consistently the
household’s choice of VMT and car type. The
two-step estimation strategies in previous stud-
ies (e.g., Goldberg, 1998; West, 2004) did not
fully integrate these decisions. Second, we were
concerned about unobserved preference hetero-
geneity, which has the potential to bias our
parameter estimates and yield implausible pre-
dictions about substitution patterns.
To address these concerns, we developed
a random-coefficient repeated discrete–
continuous model permitting simultaneous es-
timation of households’ car and VMT choices.
7 The age categories are less than 1 (new), 1–2, 3–6,
7–11, and 12–19 years old. The car classes are compact,
luxury compact, mid-size, full-size, luxury mid-size/full-size,
small SUV, large SUV, small truck, large truck, and mini-
van. The manufacturer categories are Ford, Chrysler-Daimler,
General Motors, Honda, Toyota, other East Asian, and
European.
8 Some manufacturers elect to pay a fine rather than meet
the constraint. In future work we will incorporate this op-
tion, which involves very minor changes to the objective
function and solution procedure.
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Random-coefficient specifications can generate
more plausible structures of substitution relative
to fixed parameter models (Train, 2003), and
recently developed simulation-based techniques
now make the estimation of these models com-
putationally feasible. We estimate our random-
coefficient model with the Bayesian framework,
using a variation of Gregory Allenby and Peter
Lenk’s (1994) Gibbs sampling algorithm.
The posterior means of our parameter esti-
mates were generally consistent with our a pri-
ori expectations and suggested posterior mean
VMT operating cost and income elasticities on
the order of 0.70 and 0.64, respectively. We
also found mean automobile holding elasticities
with respect to the own rental price of roughly
0.75 for all cars and trucks and 1.78 for new
cars and trucks.
III. Results
We simulate the impact of raising the federal
gasoline tax by 10, 30, or 50 cents per gallon.
The benchmark gross-of-tax price of gasoline
(which varies by state) averages around $1.45,9
so the gas-tax increments imply relative price
increases between 6 and 35 percent. We explore
two types of revenue-recycling: “tax-based re-
cycling,” in which revenues are recycled to
households in proportion to their gasoline-tax
payments, and “income-based recycling,”
where revenues are recycled in proportion to
their benchmark income.
A. Gross Efficiency Costs and Changes in
Gasoline Consumption
Table 1 indicates impacts on efficiency and
aggregate gasoline use, as well as underlying
changes in average VMT, average fuel-
efficiency, and fleet-composition. The (gross)
efficiency costs, expressed by the negative of
the equivalent variation (EV), are about $12,
$38, and $68 per household for gas tax in-
creases of 10, 30, and 50 cents, respectively.
The efficiency costs are gross in that they take
no account of environmental and other external
benefits from the policy change. The corre-
sponding average excess burdens (efficiency
cost divided by taxes collected) are 0.15, 0.17,
and 0.19. The size of this burden is not sig-
nificantly influenced by the type of revenue-
recycling. About 70 percent of the cost occurs
as deadweight loss in the gasoline market, as
implied by the wedge between producer and
consumer prices of gasoline over the induced
change in gasoline consumption. Other effi-
ciency costs stem from the tax’s impact on the
level and composition of new-car production.
From Table 1, the implied (short-run) elastic-
ity of demand for gasoline use is about 0.27.
The gas-tax increase induces a reduction in fleet
size (increase in scrappage), a decline in quan-
tity demanded of new cars relative to used cars,
9 This includes 18.5 cents in federal gasoline taxes and
(on average) 23 cents in state taxes.
TABLE 1—ECONOMY-WIDE IMPACTS OF GAS-TAX
INCREASES
Measure Base
Gas-tax increase
$0.10 $0.30 $0.50
A. Tax-Based Revenue Recycling:
Avg EV $11.55 $38.00 $68.28
Total EV/gallons avoided $0.78 $0.88 $0.98
Avg gas-tax payment $77.97 $225.40 $362.28
Avg excess burden 0.148 0.169 0.188
Avg gas consumption
(gallons)a
794.5 1.86 5.43 8.80
Avg VMT (thousands)a 19.2 1.82 5.33 8.63
Avg MPG (VMT
weighted)a
24.2 0.04 0.11 0.18
Fleet size (thousands)a
All cars 44,814.4 0.17 0.52 0.85
New cars 3,845.0 0.53 1.55 2.52
Used cars 40,969.4 0.14 0.42 0.69
High-MPG carsb 27,027.4 0.15 0.45 0.74
Low-MPG cars 17,787.0 0.21 0.63 1.03
B. Income-Based Revenue Recycling:
Avg EV ($) $11.77 $37.49 $67.48
Total EV/gallons avoided $0.73 $0.79 $0.86
Avg gas tax payment $77.83 $224.19 $358.09
Avg excess burden 0.151 0.167 0.188
Avg gas consumption
(gallons)a
794.5 2.03 5.94 9.86
Avg VMT (thousands)a 19.2 1.99 5.82 9.64
Avg MPG (VMT
weighted)a
24.2 0.05 0.13 0.24
Fleet size (thousands)a
All cars 44,814.4 0.18 0.52 1.02
New cars 3,845.0 0.56 1.65 2.38
Used cars 40,969.4 0.14 0.41 0.89
High-MPG carsb 27,027.4 0.15 0.44 0.84
Low-MPG cars 17,787.0 0.21 0.63 1.29
Notes: One gallon  3.785 liters; 1 mile  1.609 kilome-
ters; MPG  miles per gallon. Dollar amounts are in 2001
dollars. “Avg” indicates a weighted average figure per
household.
a For these rows, the rightmost three columns report
percentage changes.
b High-MPG cars include those classes with average fuel
economy over 23.6 MPG (five out of ten classes).
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and a relative increase in quantity demanded of
more fuel-efficient cars. Over 95 percent of the
reduction in gasoline consumption derives from
reduced VMT, rather than from increases in
average fuel efficiency from changes in fleet
composition. The main reason for the small
fleet-composition change is that these simula-
tions only consider the impacts in the first year
following a policy’s implementation. Thus the
effects through changes in the new-car market
are muted. Work in progress examines impacts
over the longer term.
B. Distributional Impacts
Table 2 displays the distributional impacts of
a 30-cent gas-tax increase for households
grouped by income, family size (measured by
the number of children) and stage of life (retired
or not). The welfare impact (EV) of the policy is
reported as a percentage of benchmark income.
Under tax-based recycling, the gasoline-tax in-
crease is close to proportional in its impact.10
The cost of policy for households with annual
income less than $25,000 is about 0.10 percent
of their income, while for households with in-
come greater than $75,000 it is about 0.09 per-
cent. The cost of the policy relative to income is
highest for households not retired and with chil-
dren. These households tend to drive more than
others.
The results under income-based recycling are
very different. Here the impacts are highly re-
gressive. Under income-based recycling, rela-
tively low-income (high-income) households
enjoy much lower (higher) transfers than they
do under tax-based recycling. Households earn-
ing over $75,000 per year enjoy a welfare gain
from the policy change.
Income-based recycling is relatively benefi-
cial to households that do little driving, since
these households nevertheless can enjoy signif-
icant recycled gas-tax revenues. Thus the retired
suffer welfare losses under tax-based recycling
but enjoy welfare gains under income-based
recycling. Similarly, while all car owners expe-
rience welfare losses under tax-based recycling,
only the high-probability car owners lose under
income-based recycling.11 The presence or ab-
sence of car-ownership is especially significant
for the poorest households. Indeed, these results
suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity
in the impacts of a gas tax on the poorest
households: among these households, the im-
pacts depend importantly on the nature of recy-
cling, whether the household is retired, and
presence or absence of car-ownership.
IV. Future Work
This is our first application of the model.
Several improvements and new applications are
planned. The present model only considers a
policy’s impacts in the year of its implementa-
tion. We currently are expanding the model to
10 It would be exactly proportional in the absence of
relative price changes. Such changes differentially affect the
values of household endowments and the commodities
(cars) they prefer to purchase, thus causing slight departures
from proportionality.
11 Every household has some positive probability of pur-
chasing or retaining a car. High-probability car owners here
are those for which the probability of purchasing or retain-
ing a car exceeds 25 percent per choice occasion.
TABLE 2—DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF GAS-TAX INCREASE
(FOR $0.30 INCREASE)
Group
Income ($ thousands)
	25 25–50 50–75 
75
A. Tax-Based Recycling:
EV (percentage of base income)
All households 0.103 0.108 0.098 0.092
Retired 0.093 0.105 0.089 0.094
Not retired, no children 0.104 0.105 0.103 0.092
Not retired, children 0.119 0.113 0.099 0.091
High-probability car owner 0.110 0.110 0.098 0.092
Low-probability car owner 0.084 0.089 0.099 0.091
Percentage change in VMT
All households 5.43 5.69 5.59 5.35
Retired 4.87 5.70 5.42 5.70
Not retired, no children 5.45 5.60 5.69 5.11
Not retired, children 6.39 5.78 5.58 5.49
High-probability car owner 5.48 5.61 5.53 5.24
Low-probability car owner 5.31 6.29 6.59 7.38
B. Income-Based Recycling:
EV (percentage of base income)
All households 0.216 0.205 0.077 0.079
Retired 0.033 0.038 0.132 0.189
Not retired, no children 0.311 0.164 0.116 0.093
Not retired, children 0.482 0.403 0.113 0.046
High-probability car owner 0.429 0.281 0.102 0.063
Low-probability car owner 0.356 0.393 0.360 0.368
Percentage change in VMT
All households 5.42 5.75 5.67 5.23
Retired 4.74 5.59 5.33 5.36
Not retired, no children 5.49 5.63 5.77 5.00
Not retired, children 6.50 5.99 5.70 5.40
High-probability car owner 5.56 5.73 5.63 5.14
Low-probability car owner 5.05 5.91 6.20 6.81
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enable it to examine long-run effects associated
with the gradual evolution of the automobile
fleet. We also are exploring alternative ways to
deal with the potentially very high dimension-
ality that arises from the multitude of car types
and car combinations. In subsequent applica-
tions we hope to perform a more comprehensive
assessment of distributional impacts, consider-
ing other demographic dimensions such as race
and region of residence. We would also like to
consider other policies to reduce gasoline con-
sumption, including changes to CAFE standards
and subsidies to retirements of low-mileage
vehicles.
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